BIG TECH BIAS AND ANTITRUST LAW: INDIA’S APPROACH TO SELF-PREFERENCING

- by Disha Daga & Shivam Agarwal, student at Hidayatullah National Law University, Raipur. This blog is the winning entry of the National Article Competition organized by CBLT.

I. Introduction: Big Tech and Self-Preferncing

“You can be the umpire, or you can be the player, but you can’t be both.”

                                                                                                  ~ Elizabeth Warren^[1]

The rise of advanced technology, and its integration with business, has resulted in the emergence of digital markets worldwide. Digital markets have developed over the majority of sectors of traditional markets, ranging from instant mass communication through social media platforms to e-commerce platforms facilitating trade in goods and services.^[2] A significant development in these markets is the rise of a few dominant players, commonly known as Big Tech entities, which act to gain control over the market to the detriment of other smaller entities.^[3] This has posed significant challenges to the existing notions of antitrust jurisprudence globally, which were set to deal with traditional markets.^[4] Antitrust authorities have recognized these challenges and have realized the need for instant intervention because of their multi-faceted ramifications.^[5]

A major feature of the digital markets, specifically with Big Tech, is that entities often serve as a common marketplace while simultaneously selling their products through such platforms. This has given rise to several concerns,, including that of preferential treatment, through which platforms may resort to tactics for prioritizing their own products over their competitors, creating a discriminatory imbalance in the market. In this context, the concept of ‘self-preferencing’ has emerged as a significant antitrust issue.

This article aims, firstly, to clarify the scope of the term “self-preferencing” as it is commonly understood in the antitrust realm. Secondly, it identifies the various challenges in regulating self-preferencing activities by Big Tech entities. Thirdly, it analyzes the global jurisprudence dealing with self-preferencing. Fourthly, it evaluates India’s approach to addressing the issue of self-preferencing by Big Tech. Based on such evaluation, it concludes by providing policy recommendations and charting the way forward.

II. The anatomy of self-preferencing: is it a double-edged sword? 

Self-preferencing, in principle, has been generally recognized as an anti-competitive conduct in antitrust law.^[1]  Given the wide and complex range of activities performed by digital platforms, the term “self-preferencing” cannot be precisely defined. However, in a broad sense, it can be understood as the behavior whereby an entity favors its own goods and services among those of others in its platform.^[2] This behavior results from an abuse of one’s dominant position in the market and can disrupt downstream markets, stifle innovation, and ultimately hinder consumer welfare. While this conduct exists in both traditional and digital marketplaces, its effects in the latter are particularly pronounced. This is mainly because Big Tech entities have effective control over the integrated supply chain of goods and services by their power to influence demand, making them “unavoidable trading partners”.^[3] Additionally, the “network effects”, whereby the value of a product increases as its  user base increases, amplify this control and lead to a vicious cycle. This facilitates the platform to promote its own products and increase user dependence, to further strengthen its dominance.

Recent cases have revealed that self-preferencing by Big Tech can be practiced in several ways. For instance, Google was found to have indulged in self-preferencing when it promoted its own price-comparison service “Shopping” on its platform by displaying it at the top of the search results.^[4] In 2023, Amazon was penalized for using third-party data to promote its own retail business, to the detriment of other retailers.^[5] In another case, Apple was fined for abusing its dominance in the market by restricting the dating app providers from using any third-party payment options outside its system.^[6] These cases highlight the necessity of examining whether such practices should be regulated.

While the need for regulating self-preferencing practices by Big Tech has been recognized, various scholars have pointed out that self-preferencing by itself cannot be considered to be anti-competitive.^[7] It can be seen as a natural consequence of streamlining business operations and vertical integration, which helps in cutting down excessive costs and improving efficiency.  Thus, it confers several benefits like promoting innovation and spurring consumer' convenience.^[8]

Although it has been argued that it leads to consumer welfare, in the long run, it ultimately leads to higher prices and reduced choices, because of a lack of competition in the market. Specifically, Big Tech firms may leverage and manipulate consumer data to create an artificial imbalance in the market.^[9] In India, the Competition Commission of India (“CCI”) has implicitly recognized self-preferencing while penalizing Google for directing potential consumers toward its own selling verticals^[10] and for mandatorily requiring the installation of its apps on smartphones.^[11]

While self-preferencing is not inherently anti-competitive, its potential misuse for anti-competitive activities cannot be ignored. Therefore, the need for effective regulation is recognized to ensure that entities do not hide behind the cloak of consumer welfare and efficiency while pursuing anti-competitive objectives through self-preferencing. These regulations must be tailored to deal with the dynamics of the digital markets.

III. Major Issues in Regulating Self-Preferencing by Big Tech Entities 

Given that the need to regulate self-preferencing by Big Tech has been identified globally, the determination of the nature and scope of such regulation is riddled with challenges. Big Tech firms employ sophisticated and integrated technology, which requires a different approach from those of brick-and-mortar models. Since self-preferencing is not always opposed to market competition, identifying the areas requiring regulation is essential. Therefore, the traditional notions of antitrust law are being put to the test in resolving such challenges.

Firstly, the concept of self-preferencing is difficult to define.^[12] The definitions provided under the legislations of the European Union and the United Kingdom recognize two common elements: first, the existence of two markets that are horizontally and vertically related, and second, the preference for one’s own products over others.^[13] However, the issue lies in the scope of these definitions, being too narrow or too broad. They are narrow in the sense that they fail to cover within their ambit the conduct whereby a platform and the supplier are distinct, and not integrated into one another.^[14] For example, preference is given to those suppliers who confer higher margins on products or where the supplier is successful in contracting with the platforms to prioritize their products.^[15] Despite the ramifications of these actions being the same as those of self-preferencing, they are excluded from both definitions. On the contrary, these definitions are too broad to include all the conduct by Big Tech without ascertaining the likelihood of harm to consumer welfare, which is a fundamental goal in regulating anti-competitive practices.^[16]

Secondly, there exists the problem of identifying the entities, among several Big Tech firms, that are to be included within the regulatory ambit for their self-preferencing activities. This problem is created as Big Tech includes a wide array of sectors, from social media and communication to e-commerce.[17] There is no direct correlation between the relevant markets, their size, financial performance, etc., of the entities within these sectors. Additionally, the basic service performed by each of these sectors is different. This is more so when the focus is excessively on quantitative factors, which would effectively ignore the subjectivity in the kind and quality of service rendered. Hence, the appropriateness of applying a common standard for the regulation of ‘self-preferencing’ to all these different sectors is highly doubtful.

Thirdly, there is a constant debate concerning the adoption of ex-ante and ex-post measures for regulating self-preferencing by Big Tech. The issue about the use of ex-ante measures in the digital markets is not settled globally and is often criticized.^[18] This is evident in case of the European Union as it creates a risk of regulatory obsoletion due to its inability to adapt to dynamic market conditions.[19] This is primarily because the nature of digital markets is highly dynamic, and the legislature is slow to adapt to changes, creating a risk of market failure.^[20] On the other hand, there is no uniformity of the standard to be applied in the case of ex-post regulation. Some argue that self-preferencing should be regulated only when it results in the “refusal to deal/supply”.^[21] A blanket adoption of such a restricted view may result in the omission of a range of anti-competitive conduct from the purview of regulation.^[22] Still, others contend that “refusal to deal” is too strict a standard and other traditional theories of leveraging must be employed.^[23] This would broaden the understanding to include even otherwise neutral or pro-competitive conduct.^[24] Thus, there is no foundational clarity as to the appropriateness of a per se or an effects-based approach for addressing anti-competitive self-preferencing by Big Tech.

Lastly, a rather specific concern relating to Big Tech platforms is the increasing use of biased algorithms in recent times.^[25] While the pro-consumer effects of algorithms are well recognized, their potential for misuse is a stark reality.^[26] Biased algorithms present two main problems. Primarily, given their inherent complexity, it becomes difficult to identify whether the content visible to the consumer is the result of a “steering” algorithm or an objective and neutral one.^[27] Additionally, their nature as a “black box”, i.e., operating in a manner that is opaque to outsiders, effectively denies consumers an opportunity to understand whether the choices available to them are influenced by the platforms or their own past behavior on the platform.^[28] By acting  

These challenges have attracted the attention of antitrust regulatory agencies across the globe. Several regulations have been adopted in response to these problems. However, the same are still at a nascent stage and not without lacunae. Hence, it will be relevant to examine the position of law across jurisdictions concerning Big-Tech self-preferencing.

IV. Comparative perspectives: the European Union and the United Kingdom 

With the advancement in internet technologies, countries across the world are refining the intricacies of antitrust regulation, especially concerning self-preferencing by digital platforms. In 2021, the American Innovation and Choice Online Act was introduced in the United States Congress, which aims to prohibit preferential behavior by certain specified digital entities.^[29] Among the forerunners to have specific frameworks for self-preferencing by digital platforms are the European Union and the United Kingdom. An analysis of these frameworks is quintessential for understanding the kind and scope of intervention that is best suited to address the growing concern surrounding anti-competitive self-preferencing.

Under the European Union’s Digital Markets Act (“DMA”),^[30]  Article 6(5)^[31] provides a narrow definition of self-preferencing by restricting the scope to practices only of “ranking, indexing, and crawling.” A commendable aspect, however, is that it does not prohibit all forms of “ranking, indexing, and crawling” of their own products by the platforms, but only those that are unfair, discriminatory, or not transparent. Further, it does not mandate fulfilment of indispensability criteria^[32] or the traditional requirement of dominance to be regarded as a gatekeeper.^[33] The lack of definition for “more favorably” and no disclosure requirements by the platforms about the algorithms they use will blur the lines between differentiated and preferential treatment and is a challenge in the detection of self-preferencing activities. Another significant feature of this Act is that it is self-executing in nature, i.e., it provides for several obligations to be fulfilled by the gatekeepers. The action against breach of any obligation under Article 6 is subject to the specification by the Commission. It has the discretion to initiate “non-compliance or specification proceedings” against such violations. Thus, even though this approach of assessing the practices case-by-case is a favorable one, it fails to lay down any consideration for economic factors, like the effect of self-preferencing on consumer welfare. 

In the United Kingdom, the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act, 2024^[34] (“DMCC”) regulates self-preferencing by a designated undertaking having a “strategic market status” (“SMS”). To decide whether an entity has SMS, the Competition and Markets Authority (“CMA”) shall consider whether it has “substantial and entrenched market power” and occupies “a position of strategic significance” about to the concerned digital activity. These conditions are abstractly defined. This abstraction, coupled with the limited quantitative requirement, raises concerns regarding legal certainty. It affects the objectivity of the law and confers excessive discretion on the CMA for designating entities, which may result in arbitrary and biased decisions.^[35] Unlike the DMA, the DMCC does not list any specific sectors of the digital market to which the provisions of self-preferencing shall apply. In September 2024, in one of the earliest cases of self-preferencing by a Big Tech entity after the enactment of the DMCC, the CMA stated objections against Google for allegedly favouring its own ad tech services to harm rivals.^[36]

V. Regulating self-preferencing by Big Tech: the Indian approach 

As digitalization takes hold of the global economy, India is emerging as one of the leading digital markets in the world. The dominance of a few Big Tech companies in the market poses many challenges to the existing antitrust framework in India. This section evaluates India’s response to the challenge of self-preferencing by analyzing the effectiveness of the existing law, the CCI’s approach, and the regulatory changes proposed in the bill.

India’s tryst with self-preferencing regulation has been limited to ex-post enforcement under the Competition Act, 2002.^[37] It was not recognized as explicitly as a distinct anti-competitive practice and fell within the broader provisions of abuse of dominance.^[38] The CCI has examined several instances of self-preferencing, most prominently against Google, wherein it was found to have manipulated search results to favor its own services.^[39] In another case, it was highlighted how Google leveraged its dominance in the Android ecosystem to favor its own payment system over competing UPI apps.^[40] In the MMT-Goibibo and Oyo case,^[41] the CCI has also recognized preferential treatment given by entities to favor one another in the markets. While such conduct cannot be classified as self-preferencing per se, it covers the broad principle behind addressing self-preferencing. Although these cases reflect certain important instances of intervention, they simultaneously expose the limitations in the traditional legal framework to address the conduct of Big Tech firms. These limitations include slow investigations, difficulty in assessing algorithmic conduct, and lack of market-specific rules.

In 2022, the 53rd Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance, in its report titled “Anti-Competitive Practices by Big Tech Companies”, explicitly recognized ‘self-preferencing’ as an anti-competitive practice prevalent in the digital markets.^[42] The report led to the formation of the Committee on Digital Competition Law (“CDCL”) in 2023.^[43] In its report, the CDCL, adopting both the DMA’s and the DMCC’s approach, proposes the adoption of “Systemically Significant Digital Enterprises” (“SSDEs”). These are entities that have a substantial influence over digital markets due to their size, status and network effects. The report explicitly recognizes “self-preferencing”, which was hitherto covered under the ambit of Sections 3^[44] and 4^[45] of the Competition Act, 2002, as an anti-competitive practice by SSDEs, about the specified and defined “Core Digital Service”.  It recommends an ex-ante approach, imposing a set of “core obligations”, which include a direct prohibition on self-preferencing, on SSDEs, which are to be enforced by a specialized Digital Competition Authority.

While these provisions align with the global practices, underlying them are some crucial considerations and concerns. Although the introduction of SSDEs is a welcome move to target the Big Tech entities, the thresholds for their designation, especially the qualitative factors, based on which CCI can suo moto specify them, must be tested fairly and transparently to avoid the potential for bias. This is essential because once an entity is designated as an SSDE, it would be subject to ex-ante obligations. The definition of self-preferencing is broad in the sense that it does not limit the prohibition to specific practices like ranking or indexing, and it also extends to the indirect promotion of not just one’s own products, but also those of related third parties. The lack of a clear test to distinguish between pro-competitive and anti-competitive conduct gives a wider leeway to authorities to tackle diverse forms of preferential treatment, raising concerns of regulatory overreach, even when such practice is for consumer benefit.  Significantly, the proposed bill incorporates a crucial anti-circumvention clause which prohibits enterprises from circumventing the thresholds under Section 3(2) of the bill by any means of segmentation, division or splitting of services. This provisions prevents the possibility of Big Tech firms exploiting loopholes through contracts or corporate structuring to dilute regulatory oversight. The adoption of an ex-ante approach is a major departure from the existing effects-based model in India. However, it is different from the EU model in that it allows authorities to levy penalties for non-compliance. While this could incentivize Big Tech to pre-emptively adjust its business models, it must be noted that no specific thresholds of consumer harm are required, allowing for the potential abuse of power.

VI. Conclusion: The Road Ahead

The proposals of the CDCL offer a much-needed starting point to respond to the growing dominance of Big Tech. They provide significant inputs to recalibrate India’s competition regulation regime with the digital revolution. However, the success of these proposals will depend upon contextual assessment, the adoption of precise standards, and a proactive approach.

Firstly, the concept of self-preferencing must be narrowly defined. A more practical approach would be to recognize the difference between legitimate and bona fide integration and discriminatory conduct that suppresses competitive tendencies. This can be achieved by defining certain exceptions, based on objective justification, on a sector-by-sector basis. Secondly, clear thresholds must be prioritized for designating SSDEs. Qualitative factors must be defined narrowly to prevent overbreadth in the law. Thirdly, the imposition of ex-ante obligations must be adequately justified by a standard of harm, considering that digital markets are prone to swift changes. Pre-emptive prohibitions carry the risk of unduly regulating otherwise legal conduct and hence must be backed by a visibly positive risk to competitors or consumers. Therefore, a ‘rule of reason’ standard can be adopted to allow pro-competitive practices.

As Big Tech companies are now occupying a “dual role” in the digital markets, the issue of self-preferencing threatens the idea of fair competition and consumer welfare. In response, various jurisdictions have introduced targeted regulations, including India through its proposed Digital Competition Bill. However, the true essence of such regulation ultimately lies in the hands of the implementing authority, i.e., the CCI. The CCI now bears the responsibility to strike a balance between curbing these anti-competitive practices and fostering innovation.^[46] For a robust future of the Indian digital economy, the government intervention must be both precautionary and proportionate, strict enough to prevent abuses by Big Tech, yet flexible enough to promote technological advancement.

^[1] Jonathan Jacobson and Ada Wang, ‘Competition or Competitors? The Case of Self-Preferencing’ (2023) 38(1) Antitrust 13 <https://www.wsgr.com/a/web/bW8aKf3yEkMqwKUwDCRi6D/jacobson-fall23.pdf> accessed 8 April 2025.​

^[2] Guillaume Duquesne, Thomas Bowman, Thibaut de Bernard, Kadambari Prasad and Paul Armstrong, ‘What Constitutes Self-Preferencing and Its Proliferation in Digital Markets’ (Global Competition Review, 2 October 2024) <https://globalcompetitionreview.com/guide/digital-markets-guide/fourth-edition/article/what-constitutes-self-preferencing-and-its-proliferation-in-digital-markets> accessed 25 March 2025 (“Guillaume Duquesne and others”).

^[3] Giuseppe Colangelo, ‘Antitrust Unchained: The EU’s Case Against Self-Preferencing’ (2023) 72(6) GRUR International 538 <https://doi.org/10.1093/grurint/ikad023> accessed 25 March 2025.

^[4]  European Commission, ‘Commission Decision of 27 June 2017 Relating to Proceedings Under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area (AT.39740 – Google Search (Shopping))’ C (2017) 4444 final, 27 June 2017, <https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39740/39740_14996_3.pdf > accessed 5 April 2025.​

^[5] Competition and Markets Authority, ‘Investigation into Amazon’s Marketplace’ (GOV.UK, 5 July 2022) <https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/investigation-into-amazons-marketplace> accessed 5 April 2025.

^[6] Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets, ‘Summary of Decision on Abuse of Dominant Position by Apple’ (24 August 2021) <https://www.acm.nl/sites/default/files/documents/summary-of-decision-on-abuse-of-dominant-position-by-apple.pdf > accessed 5 April 2025.

^[7] Guillaume Duquesne and others (n 7).

^[8] Aurelien Portuese, ‘“Please, Help Yourself”: Toward a Taxonomy of Self-Preferencing’ (Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, 25 October 2021) <https://itif.org/publications/2021/10/25/please-help-yourself-toward-taxonomy-self-preferencing/> accessed March 26 2025.

^[9] Zachary Austin Williams, ‘Big Tech Becomes Psychic: The End of Personal Autonomy’ (2024) 15(2) JLTI 220.

^[10] Matrimony.com Limited Vs. Google LLC & Others Consumer Unity & Trust Society Vs. Google LLC & Others (“Matrimony v. Google”), Case Nos. 7 and 30 of 2012 (CCI 31 January 2018).

^[11] Mr. Umar Javeed and Others Vs. Google LLC and Another, Case No. 39 of 2018 (CCI 20 October 2022).

^[12] Yi Huang, ‘“Self-preferencing”: An Analysis on the Way of Anti-Competitive Conduct’ (2023) 29 Lecture Notes in Education Psychology and Public Media 108 <https://doi.org/10.54254/2753-7048/29/20231423> accessed March 29 2025.

^[13] Pablo Ibáñez Colomo, ‘Self-Preferencing: Yet Another Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles’ (2020) 43 World Competition (forthcoming) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3654083> accessed 6 April 2025.

^[14] Peter Ormosi, ‘The Legal Definition of Self-Preferencing: Too Narrow, Too Broad, or Both?’ (Centre for Competition Policy, 8 November 2023) <https://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/blog/the-legal-definition-of-self-preferencing-too-narrow-too-broad-or-both/> accessed 5 April 2025.

^[15] Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Associations of India and Ors v. MakeMyTrip India Pvt Ltd and Ors (“Federation v. MakeMyTrip”), Case No. 14 of 2019 and Case No. 01 of 2020 (CCI 19 October 2022).

^[16] Shruti Rajagopalan, Shreyas Narla, ‘The CCI’s Arbitrary Scrutiny is Jeopardising India’s Global Tech Hub Dreams’ Outlook Business (28 January 2025) <https://www.outlookbusiness.com/columns/the-ccis-arbitrary-scrutiny-is-jeopardising-indias-global-tech-huba-dreams> accessed 1 April 2025.

[17] Erik Feyen, Jon Frost, Leonardo Gambacorta, Harish Natarajan and Matthew Saal, 'Fintech and the digital transformation of financial services: implications for market structure and public policy' (2021) BIS <https://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap117.pdf> accessed 20 August 2025.

^[18] Saket Sharma, ‘Competition Through Evolution, Not Pre-Selection: A Case Against Ex-Ante Regulations in India’ (NLS Business Law Review Blog, 2 July 2024) <https://www.nlsblr.com/post/competition-through-evolution-not-pre-selection-a-case-against-ex-ante-regulations-in-india> accessed 6 April 2025.

[19] Ibid.

^[20] Ibid.

^[21] Bo Vesterdorf, ‘Theories of Self-Preferencing and Duty to Deal – Two Sides of the Same Coin?’ (2015) 1(1) CLPD 4 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2561355> accessed 6 April 2025.

^[22] Guillaume Duquesne and others (n 7).

^[23] Nicolas Petit, ‘Theories of Self-Preferencing Under Article 102 TFEU: A Reply to Bo Vesterdorf’ (2015) 1 CLPD <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2592253> accessed 8 April 2025.

^[24] Guillaume Duquesne and others (n 7).

^[25]The Hindu, ‘Google Search Engine Algorithm Tweak Affects Small Businesses’ (The Hindu, 4 April 2025) <https://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/technology/google-search-engine-algorithm-tweak-affects-small-businesses/article68362161.ece> accessed 6 April 2025.

^[26] Giovanna Massarotto, ‘Why is algorithmic bias and why antitrust agencies should care?’ (2023) CPI Antitrust Chronicle <https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/1-WHAT-IS-ALGORITHMIC-BIAS-AND-WHY-ANTITRUST-AGENCIES-SHOULD-CARE-Giovanna-Massarotto.pdf> accessed 1 April 2025.

^[27] Emilie Feyler and Veronica Postal, ‘Can Self-Preferencing Algorithms Be Pro-Competitive?’ (2023) CPI Antitrust Chronicle <https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/5-CAN-SELF-PREFERENCING-ALGORITHMS-BE-PRO-COMPETITIVE-Emilie-Feyler-Veronica-Postal.pdf> accessed 1 April 2025.

^[28] Ibid.

^[29] American Innovation and Choice Online Act, S 2992, 117th Congress (2021–2022).

^[30] Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act) [2022] OJ L265/1 (“DMA”).

^[31] art 6(5) DMA.

^[32] Jörg Hoffmann, Liza Herrmann and Lukas Kestler, ‘Gatekeeper’s Potential Privilege—the Need to Limit DMA Centralization’ (2024) 12(1) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 126. <https://academic.oup.com/antitrust/article/12/1/126/7236014> accessed 6 April 2025.

^[33] Case C‑48/22 P, Google and Alphabet v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2024:726, 10 September 2024.

^[34] Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 (UK).

^[35] Verity Egerton-Doyle and James Hunter, ‘The UK’s New Digital Markets Regime: Unfettered Discretion and Power for the CMA’ (Kluwer Competition Law Blog, 7 October 2024) <https://competitionlawblog.kluwercompetitionlaw.com/2024/10/07/the-uks-new-digital-markets-regime-unfettered-discretion-and-power-for-the-cma/> accessed 6 April 2025.

^[36] Competition and Markets Authority, ‘Investigation into Suspected Anti-Competitive Conduct by Google in Ad Tech’ (GOV.UK, 26 May 2022) <https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/investigation-into-suspected-anti-competitive-conduct-by-google-in-ad-tech> accessed 6 April 2025.

^[37] The Competition Act 2002 (India) (“Competition Act 2002”).

^[38] s 4 Competition Act 2002.

^[39] Matrimony v. Google (n 15).

^[40] XYZ (Confidential) v. Alphabet Inc., Case no. 07 of 2020 (CCI 9 November 2020).

^[41] Federation v. MakeMyTrip (n 20).

^[42] Standing Committee on Finance, Anti-Competitive Practices by Big Tech Companies (2022-23, 53).

^[43] Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Report of the Committee on Digital Competition Law (2024).

^[44] s 3 Competition Act 2002.

^[45] s 4 Competition Act 2002.

^[46] Matrimony v. Google (n 15).

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^[2] Kate Gibson, ‘Digital Platforms: What They Are and How They Create Value’ (Harvard Business School Online, 8 May 2024) <https://online.hbs.edu/blog/post/what-is-a-digital-platform> accessed 25 March 2025.

^[3] Shaleen Khanal, Hongzhou Zhang and Araz Taeihagh, ‘Why and How is the Power of Big Tech Increasing in the Policy Process? The Case of Generative AI’ (2024) 44 (1) Policy and Society, <https://doi.org/10.1093/polsoc/puae012> accessed 25 March 2025.

^[4] Niamh Dunne, ‘Competition Law vs the Tech Giants’ (LSE Online Learning) <https://www.lse.ac.uk/study-at-lse/online-learning/insights/competition-law-vs-the-tech-giants> accessed 26 March 2025.

^[5] Micah Issitt, ‘Big Tech and Antitrust Law: Overview’ (EBSCO Research Starters, 2024) <https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/law/big-tech-and-antitrust-law-overview#:~:text=Monopolies%20and%20trusts%20frequently%20raise,to%20the%20detriment%20of%20consumers> accessed 25 March 2025.